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The development of offshore mineral resources is a relatively
new industry that has grown at a breathtaking pace. The first off-
shore operations' were conducted from small barges operating in
shallow waters off the coast of Louisiana and Texas. Now, drilling
and production facilities are located worldwide. Once a predominantly
American domain, the industry is now truly international in scope.
Multinational operating companies, drilling and service contractors,
and service boat operators abound, and offshore workers are drawn
from all corners of the globe.
One factor has remained constant in offshore petroleum opera-
tions-the work has many hazards combining the dangers inherent
in marine employment with those of the oil field.' Workers continue
to be injured and killed, and claims arising out of such incidents
must be resolved. The law governing the rights and liabilities of
such workers arising out of injuries offshore is complex even when
all of the parties are American, the injury takes place in United
States territorial waters or on the United States Outer Continental
Shelf, and there is no question but that American law will be ap-
plied.' The international character of the industry and the increasing
tendency of foreign workers to seek recoveries in United States
courts have added new and complex problems. This article will
discuss the conflict of laws problems that arise in litigation of injury
*Member, Louisiana Bar; Texas Bar.
1. The terms "offshore operations," "offshore industry," etc. will be used
throughout this article to refer to the business of exploring for and producing mineral
resources, particularly hydrocarbons, in areas that are under water. Thus, the term
"offshore" will refer equally to activities conducted in inland waters, territorial waters
and the waters superadjacent to the Continental Shelf. It will be used in contradistinc-
tion to "bluewater" activities, a term generally used to connote traditional carriage of
goods and persons by sea. It should be noted that there are activities, such as trans-
ocean towage of drilling rigs, that might be characterized as both "offshore" and
"bluewater" activities.
2. See Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 780 (5th Cir. 1959).
3. For a detailed discussion of the rights of offshore workers in the United
States, see Robertson, Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical
Simplification, 55 TEX. L. REv. 973 (1977).
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and death claims arising from overseas offshore operations; and, it
will focus on the question of whether the law of the United States
will be applied by an American court to determine the rights of an
injured foreign worker or his survivors.
RELATIONSHIP OF CHOICE OF LAW TO OTHER PROBLEMS
The choice-of-law problem has been greatly complicated by the
interrelationship of related jurisdictional and procedural problems.
The tendency of defense counsel to throw in every conceivable
defense, together with a failure at times by the bench and bar to
carefully delineate discrete concepts, has led to a great deal of con-
fusion in the jurisprudence over the nature of the problem.' Before
discussing the choice-of-law problem, it may be helpful to carefully
set forth the related issues.
First, questions of subject matter jurisdiction are almost never
involved in these cases, despite the repeated references to this issue
in the reports.5 Usually, admiralty jurisdiction is unquestionably pre-
sent. If an occurrence takes place on navigable waters and bears a
"significant relationship to traditional maritime activity,"' admiralty
tort jurisdiction is present, and no lack of contacts with the United
States will defeat that jurisdiction.7 Moreover, if the plaintiff pleads
a Jones Act count, federal question jurisdiction will lie under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.8 If the foreign connections are such that the Jones
Act9 is inapplicable, the appropriate remedy is to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, not to dismiss for
4. See, e.g., Grevas v. M/V Olympic Pegasus, 1978 A.M.C. 1442 (E.D. Va. 1978);
Hoidas v. Orion & Global Chartering Co., Inc., 440 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
5. See, e.g., Dassigienis v. Cosmos Carriers & Trading Corp., 1971 A.M.C. 1104,
1105 (2d Cir. 1971): "[Tlhe test of subject matter jurisdiction involves an analysis of
various connecting factors which might justify the application of United States law to
a particular claim." See also Sanchez v. Caribbean Carriers, Ltd., 552 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.
1977); Frangiskatos v. Konkar Maritime Enterprises, S.A., 1973 A.M.C. 333 (2d Cir.
1972).
6. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
7. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885).
8. In both Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), and Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), the Supreme Court made it quite clear
that the invocation of jurisdiction by a colorable claim that the Jones Act applied was
sufficient to vest the court with subject matter jurisdiction:
As frequently happens, a contention that there is some barrier to granting plain-
tiffs claim is cast in terms of an exception to jurisdiction of subject matter. A
cause of action under our law was asserted here, and the court had power to
determine whether it was or was not well founded in law and in fact.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 575 (1953).
9. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
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lack of jurisdiction.0 Finally, diversity or alienage jurisdiction is
often present.11
While subject matter jurisdiction is seldom a relevant question,
questions of personal jurisdiction are often present. Confusion is
common in these matters because of the related nature of the
arguments. One of the developments in the choice-of-law
jurisprudence has been the attempt to apply United States law
because of the beneficial ownership of a defendant vessel or corpora-
tion by American interests. 2 Similarly, attempts are often made to
assert jurisdiction over a party in this country because of a party's
American parent or subsidiary corporations. The argument may
focus on the due process question: Does ABC Corporation have
minimum contacts with the forum because of the activities of its
parent or subsidiary XYZ Corporation within the jurisdiction?" Or,
the argument may focus on the exercise of jurisdiction through ser-
vice of process: Can service of process on ABC Corporation be ob-
tained through service on its parent or subsidiary corporation, XYZ
Corporation?' Because the answers to these questions will often
vary because of the different state procedures for obtaining service
of process," no attempt will be made here to thoroughly explore this
problem. Suffice it to say that jurisdiction is a separate and distinct
problem from the question of choice-of-law.
Finally, the question of applicable law is inextricably tied to the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. This doctrine permits a court to
exercise its discretion to refuse to entertain an action within its
jurisdiction. In the principal case on the subject, Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert,"8 the Supreme Court listed as one pertinent factor in exer-
cising this discretion the desire of a court to obviate having to "un-
tangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself."'7
10. Of course, often the lack of domestic contacts will not appear on the face of
the pleadings and will have to be established by affidavit. In such cases, the ap-
propriate procedural device is a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Merren v.
A/S Borgestad, 519 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1975).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
12. See notes 77-105, infra.
13. See, e.g., Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 535 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1976);
Castanho v. Jackson Marine, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Edwards v. Gulf
Mississippi Marine Corp., 449 F, Supp. 1363 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
14. See, e.g., Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 535 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1976);
Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1972); Edwards v. Gulf Mississippi Marine
Corp., 449 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7) & 4(e).
16. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
17. Id. at 509.
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Thus, the decision of a court to apply foreign law is often the first
step in a decision to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens.
Indeed, some courts have indicated that in the area of seamen's per-
sonal injury actions, it is a necessary first step and that a court may
not dismiss an action to which American law is applicable.18
The interrelationship of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
with choice-of-law problems had led to a great deal of confusion.
Many courts have failed to recognize that two separate doctrines
are involved, and one court has even referred to Lauritzen v.
Larsen, the landmark decision on choice-of-law, as "an exhaustive
opinion . . . on the question of determining whether to exercise
jurisdiction by discretion."' 9 Even courts that have recognized that
two discrete concepts are involved have often assumed that the
same criteria should be used to determine both the applicable law
and whether the court should exercise or decline jurisdiction under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
2 0
The better reasoned decisions, on the other hand, distinguish be-
tween the questions of applicable law and appropriate forum and re-
cognize that different criteria and different burdens of proof and
standards of review apply to the two doctrines.2 First, different
criteria have different significance in analyzing the two problems,
and some factors relevant to one question are irrelevant to the
others. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that the avail-
ability of an alternative forum, while a significant factor in deter-
mining whether to retain jurisdiction or dismiss on the basis of
forum non conveniens, is of almost no consequence in determination
of choice-of-law issues. 2' And while the plaintiff's choice of forum is
of no consequence whatsoever in the determination of the law to be
18. See, e.g., Antypas v. Cia. Maritima San Basilio S.A., 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.
1976); Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959); Ying Shiue
Jye Fen v. Sanko Kisen (USA) Corp., 1977 A.M.C. 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). It might be
argued that this rule may be questionable after the recent decision in Alcoa S.S. Co. v.
M/V Nordic Regent, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1980), which held that an action brought
by an American citizen can be dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens.
19. Grevas v. M/V Olympic Pegasus, 1978 A.M.C. 1442, 1445 (E.D. Va. 1978).
20. Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 346 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1965); Kearney v.
Savannah Foods & Industries, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Ga. 1972). See Gkiafis v. S.S.
Yiosonas, 1967 A.M.C. 2568 (4th Cir. 1967) (same factors applicable, but are to be given
different weight).
21. Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V, 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980), contains an excellent
discussion of the interrelationship of the choice-of-law and forum non conveniens doc-
trines. For the reaons expressed below, this author feels that the court's determination
of the choice-of-law question in that case is totally unsupportable.
22. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 589-90 (1953).
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applied, it is a very significant factor in determining whether to
dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens.3
Secondly, while the determination of applicable law is a question
of law, the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, on
the other hand, rests in the sound discretion of the trial court," and
thus the scope of review is somewhat limited. 5 Moreover, the de-
fendant must show that an injustice will result by the retention of
jurisdiction and not merely that the plaintiff would not suffer an in-
justice by dismissal.26
The doctrine of forum non conveniens assumes the availability of
an alternative forum. The idea of an alternative forum requires an
alternative neutral forum, but the courts generally are unwilling to
assume that a foreign court will not dispense justice evenhandedly,
and they usually require the plaintiff opposing dismissal to affir-
matively show the nature of the judicial bias in the alternative
forum. 8 Assuming that an alternative forum is available, the rele-
vant factors in determining a forum non conveniens question are the
"private interest" factors of accessibility of proof and witnesses, en-
forceability of any resulting judgment, the ability to join additional
parties in the various alternative fora, and the ease and expense of
litigation in the forum, and the "public interest" factors such as the
burden created for local court calendars and local juries by trials
having no connection with the forum.' One factor that has generally
been considered to be irrelevant is whether one party will be more
likely to prevail or be entitled to a greater or lesser recovery in one
of the fora.2
THE RIGHTS OF OFFSHORE WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES
A discussion of when American law will govern the rights of off-
23. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
24. Id.
25. Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V, 628 F.2d 308, 312-15 (5th Cir. 1980).
26. This is the standard applied in maritime cases generally. Poseidon Schiffahrt,
G.M.B.H. v. M/S Netuno, 474 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1973). Because of the commingling of
choice-of-law factors with forum non conveniens factors in personal injury cases, it is
sometimes difficult to tell what standard has been applied. In Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos
V. 628 F.2d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1980), the court stated that the general rule was ap-
plicable in personal injury litigation as well.
27. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
28. Allianz Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft Munich Reinsurance Co. v. S.S.
Eskisehir, 1972 A.M.C. 2231 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
29. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V, 628
F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1980).
30. See, e.g., Kearney v. Savannah Foods & Industries, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.
Ga. 1972).
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shore workers injured overseas is somewhat meaningless without
some understanding of the rights of those workers in a purely
American setting. The factual settings in which claims can arise are
almost innumerable, and any attempt to thoroughly discuss the de-
velopment of the American law governing offshore injuries would be
well beyond the scope of this article. However, the following encap-
sulation may be helpful."
Exploratory drilling is usually conducted from special purpose
vessels that can be moved from place to place. Drilling rigs may be
mounted on ship-shape drilling vessels, jack-up drilling rigs, submer-
sible barges or semi-submersible vessels.2 For the purposes of per-
sonal injury litigation, all of these structures are treated as vessels
in United States maritime personal injury law. 3 Offshore production
operations also frequently call for the use of special purpose vessels,
such as dredges, pipelay barges, and derrick barges. These are all
considered to be vessels for the purposes of United States maritime
personal injury law. 4 Both exploration and production offshore also
call for use of a number of more traditional vessels, including crew-
boats, supply boats, seismographic research vessels, tugs, and deck
barges used to transport cargo. Finally, production operations usual-
ly require the construction of fixed structures permanently attached
to the ocean bottom. The rights of offshore workers in the United
States turn largely upon the type of structure on which the injury
occurs and where the structure is located at the time of injury."
Seamen
Since floating drilling rigs, other special purpose vessels, and of
course, more traditional craft are considered "vessels" for the pur-
poses of the Jones Act and the general maritime law, employees
"more or less permanently" assigned to work on such structures are
considered "seamen."36 As such, they have a cause of action under
the Jones Act against their employer for negligence and actions
under the general maritime law for maintenance and cure and un-
seaworthiness. Claims against third parties (ie., non-employers) are
31. See Robertson, supra note 3.
32. See M. SUMMERSKILL, OIL RIGS: LAW AND INSURANCE (1979).
33. See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1312, 1318 (1961).
34. Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1975); Porche v.
Gulf Mississippi Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1975).
35. Robertson, supra note 3, at 982.




also usually within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts
and are governed by the general maritime law.87
Non-Seamen Injured on Vessels
The rights of injured workers who cannot show a sufficiently
permanent relationship to a vessel to be classified as "seamen" de-
pend upon whether the injury takes place on a vessel or a fixed plat-
form, and whether the injury takes place in United States territorial
waters or waters superadjacent to the Outer Continental Shelf.
Prior to 1972, all such workers injured aboard vessels on the "navi-
gable waters of the United States" were covered under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.8 How-
ever, the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA introduced a require-
ment that a worker be engaged in "maritime employment" before
coverage would be available. 9 Since much offshore work is not
necessarily considered "maritime employment,"' the amendments
have severely limited the scope of the Longshoremen's Act as ap-
plied to offshore workers within United States territorial waters.
While it appears that the survivors of such workers killed in ter-
ritorial waters can maintain an action for wrongful death against the
37. Claims by seamen against third parties for injuries occuring on a vessel have
almost uniformly been held to be within the admiralty jurisdiction and governed by
maritime law. See, e.g., In re Dearborn Marine Service, Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.
1974). In some limited circumstances, state law may govern some claims by seamen,
even though the claim is within the jurisdiction. Baggett v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 863,
864 (5th Cir. 1973).
38. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (1978). In Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114
(1962), the Supreme Court held that any worker injured on navigable waters was
covered under this Act.
39. The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA define the term "employee" as
Any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or
other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor worker including
a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship breaker, but such term does not include a
master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by the master
to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.
33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (1978). Some courts and writers have taken the position that since
the 1972 amendments were meant to expand, not limit, coverage under the LHWCA,
any work done on actual navigable waters should thus be considered "maritime
employment." Fusco v. Perini North River Associates, 601 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1979),
vacated, 100 S. Ct. (1980); St. Julien v. Diamond M. Drilling, 403 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D.
La. 1975); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6 (2d ed. 1975); Comment,
Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REV. 683 (1973). This view has
been rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth circuits. Thibodaux v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 580 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1978); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528
F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975).
40. Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1978).
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decedent's employer,'1 it is thus far unsettled whether a worker who
is merely injured has a similar tort remedy against his employer, is
restricted to a state workers' compensation remedy, or simply has
no remedy whatsoever.'2
Injuries to non-seaman workers aboard vessels beyond ter-
ritorial waters and above the Outer Continental Shelf are covered
under the LHWCA. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting
from any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted
on the Outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for,
developing, removing, or transporting by pipeline the natural
resources, or involving rights to the natural resources, of the
subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf, compensation
shall be payable under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. For the purposes of the ex-
tension of the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act under this section-
41. Id. at 847
42. In Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1978), a worker
met his death by drowning when a small boat transporting him and other oil field
workers sank. The Fifth Circuit held that the decedent was not engaged in "maritime
employment" and was not covered by the LHWCA. Thus, the exclusive liability provi-
sions of the LHWCA did not preclude a wrongful death action against the decedent's
employer. The court then held that the wrongful death action under the general
maritime law created by Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), was not
precluded by the exclusive liability provisions of the Louisiana workmen's compensa-
tion statute.
The decision is troubling in that at least four decisions of the United States
Supreme Court directly on point were completely ignored. In Grant Smith-Porter Ship
Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S 469 (1922), Millers' Indem. Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59
(1926), Sultan Ry. v. Dept. of Labor, 277 U.S. 135 (1928), and Alaska Packers Assoc. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467 (1928), the Supreme Court had held that
state compensation remedies could constitutionally apply to workers killed or injured
on navigable waters if engaged in "maritime but local" work and were not preempted
by the general maritime law. See Comment, supra note 39. The court in Thibodaux
made no attempt to distinguish these decisions, apparently on the theory that they had
been overruled sub silentio by Moragne.
The implications of Thibodaux have not yet been considered by the courts. If the
rule as to wrongful death is to be expanded to personal injuries, non-maritime workers
injured on navigable waters might have a remedy analogous to the Jones Act: a cause
of action for negligence, untrammelled by such doctrines as contributory negligence.
On the other hand, it could be argued that such workers are restricted to the remedy
they had against their employers prior to the line of decisions which allowed the ap-
plication of state compensation acts. Perhaps the best approach would be to limit this
unfortunate decision strictly to its facts.
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(1) the term "employee" does not include a master or
member of a crew of any vessel . . .
The broad description of "operations conducted on the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf' would seem broad enough to include all workers
engaged in what is generally referred to as the "offshore" industry.
Of course, if a worker can show that he is a seaman, he comes
within the exclusion to LHWCA coverage and has the traditional
seaman's remedies.
Claims against non-employers for injuries to non-seamen occur-
ring on vessels are, in general, within the admiralty jurisdiction and
governed by maritime law." No distinction should exist between in-
juries occurring in state waters and those occurring in waters of the
Outer Continental Shelf. It is important to distinguish, however, be-
tween vessel-based acts of negligence and platform-based
negligence, since claims arising out of negligent acts on platforms
are usually non-maritime, even though the effect of the negligence
may occur on a vessel.
45
Injuries on Platforms
Injuries occuring on fixed platforms are in general beyond the
scope of maritime law. However, if a seaman is injured on a plat-
form, he still has rights under the Jones Act and for maintenance
and cure against his employer, since these actions are viewed as
arising out of the seaman/employer relationship and thus are signifi-
cantly maritime even though the injury did not occur on navigable
waters.4 ' Non-seamen injured on platforms have only compensation
remedies against their employers. If the platform is located in state
territorial waters, state compensation law usually applies.47 If the in-
jury takes place on a platform on the Outer Continental Shelf, the
43. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1976).
44. In re Dearborn Marine Service, Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. Id.
46. Koesler v. Harvey Applicators, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. La. 1976).
47. A platform in state waters might be considered "navigable waters of the
United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way,
marine railway, other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading,
unloading, repair or building a vessel)," within the meaning of 33 U.S.C. § 903, in that
supply vessels are customarily tied alongside such platforms to discharge, thus satisfy-
ing the situs test of LHWCA coverage. See Neal v. Wilson Wireline Service, 2 Bev.
Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 88 (1975); Henning v. Vacco Wireline Service, 2 Bey. Rev. Bd.
Serv. (MB) 87 (1975); Wiley v. Wilson Wireline Service, 2 Bev. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 86
(1975); Robertson, supra note 3, at 994 n.146. However, offshore work is generally not




LHWCA is the exclusive compensation law by virtue of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act. 8 Where injuries occur either on plat-
forms in state waters or on the Outer Continental Shelf, claims
against third parties (i.e., non-employers) are governed by state law.
In the case of platforms in state waters, state law is applicable ex
proprio vigore. On the Outer Continental Shelf, state law is made
applicable by the terms of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.4"
Of course, all of these generalizations must be finetuned depend-
ing on the facts and circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, this
general outline of federal admiralty jurisdiction and the remedies of
offshore workers injured in the United States should provide a
starting point in discussing cases which also include foreign factors.
FOREIGN MARITIME CLAIMS AND CHOICE OF
LAW: DEVELOPMENT IN THE "BLUEWATER" SETTING
As noted in the previous discussion, many offshore workers are
classified as "seamen" for Jones Act purposes. Roughnecks on
mobile drilling rigs, welders on pipelay barges, oilers on dredges,
and of course crewmen on service vessels are all Jones Act seamen
in instances in which American law is applicable.
Moreover, the same criteria that determine whether the Jones
Act is applicable have been held to apply to determine maritime
choice-of-law issues generally. 0 Thus, for example, the same analysis
is appropriate to determine whether a seaman may assert claims
under American law for unseaworthiness or maintenance and cure
as determines the applicability of the Jones Act,5 and the same
analysis governs whether a claim may be asserted under the Death
on the High Seas Act 2 or whether the claimant must resort to
48. See text at note 43, supra.
49. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1976); Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S.
352 (1969).
50. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
51. Id.
52. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1976). Section 761 provides as follows:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the
United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit
for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the ex-
clusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child or dependent
relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if
death had not ensued.
Since the purpose of the Act was to provide a remedy where state law was incompe-
tent to do so, the Act has been interpreted to apply to foreign territorial waters, even
[Vol. 41
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foreign law.5" Similarly, these criteria should also apply to determine
whether a platform worker injured on a crewboat en route to the
platform can assert a cause of action based on United States general
maritime law against a third party crew boat operator. 4 Thus, the
determination of the rights of workers in a foreign offshore setting
under Ameican maritime law must begin with a consideration of the
development of the law governing the applicability of the Jones Act.
The fountainhead of modern jurisprudence in this area is the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Lauritzen v.
Larsen.5 Lauritzen arose out of an injury to a Danish seaman
aboard a Danish flag vessel in Havana harbor. The vessel was own-
ed by a Danish subject, and the seaman had signed articles pro-
viding that the rights of crew members would be governed by
Danish law and by the collective bargaining agreement entered into
though such waters are not technically "high seas." Cormier v. Williams/Sedco/Horn
Constr., 460 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. La. 1978); First & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Adams,
1979 A.M.C. 2860 (E.D. Va. 1979). However, while the Act may have broad territorial
application, its applicability is still subject to the same choice-of-law criteria as other
maritime claims. See note 53, infra.
53. Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1966); Fitzgerald v.
Zim Israel Navigation Co., 1975 A.M.C. 1425 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Fitzgerald v. Texaco,
Inc., 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975), might indicate that the factors used to determine the
applicability of the Jones Act or general maritime law to a claim by a seaman against
his employer are to be applied somewhat differently when one is determining whether
the Death on the High Seas Act governs a wrongful death claim against a non-
employer. In that case, the S/T Texaco Caribbean was in a collision with the M/V
Paracas in the English Channel. The Texaco Caribbean, a Panamanian vessel owned by
a Panamanian subsidiary of Texaco, sank, and the next day the derelict was struck by
the M/V Brandenburg. Suit was filed by the administrator of the estates of twelve
German crewmen of the Brandenburg. The district court dismissed on the basis of
forum non conveniens. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the Death on the
High Seas Act was in applicable for want of significant contacts of the United States
with the incident.
The decision raises some interesting questions. Prior to the Fitzgerald opinion, the
Second Circuit had generally taken the position that beneficial ownership by American
interests was in and of itself a significant contact with the United States so as to war-
rant the application of our law to seamen's claims against employers. See Moncada v.
Lemuria Shipping Corp., 491 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1974); Bartholomew v. Universe
Tankships, Inc., 163 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959). In Fitzgerald, the beneficial ownership of
the vessel undoubtedly lay largely in the United States, yet the court did not even
mention this line of authority, which was reaffirmed a year later in Antypas v. Cia.
Maritima San Basilio, S.A., 541 F.2d 307 (1976). Fitzgerald might be viewed as simply
a healthy aberration in the Second Circuit's expansive view of the purview of
American law. On the other hand, it may indicate that "substantial contacts" cannot be
found in mere beneficial ownership, but must also include an employment relationship.
Finally, the decision may indicate that a slightly different analysis applies to wrongful
death claims.
54. See note 53, supra.
55. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
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between the Danish Seamen's Union, of which the seaman was a
member, and the employer. The only connections with the United
States were that the seaman had signed articles and joined the ship
while temporarily in New York and had managed to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in the Southern District of New
York. The lower courts held that the Jones Act applied.
Mr. Justice Jackson framed the issue as "whether statutes of
the United States should be applied to this claim of maritime tort.""6
Thus, the opinion in one sense could be viewed as simply an exercise
in statutory construction. In determining the reach of the Jones Act,
however, the Court turned to a "usage as old as the Nation"57 that
our statutory law should be "construed to apply only to areas and
transactions in which American law would be considered operative
under prevalent doctrines of international law." 8 This language
alone would certainly support reading the opinion to call for applica-
tion of traditional choice-of-law methodology. Moreover, the opinion
is replete with references that leave little doubt that the Court felt
that it was not just attempting to discuss the reach of a statute, but
rather was balancing the competing interests of diverse jurisdic-
tions. "
To aid in the analysis, the Court enumerated the "seven immor-
tal pillars,""0 the factors "generally conceded to influence choice of
law to govern a tort claim, particularly a maritime tort claim," 1 and
discussed the weight to be accorded each one generally and under
the specific facts of that case.
56. Id. at 573.
57. Id. at 577.
58. Id.
59. The Court referred to judicial development of the maritime law by courts
"long accustomed to dealing with admiralty problems in reconciling our own with
foreign interests and in accommodating the reach of our own laws to those of other
maritime nations," id. at 577, and quoted Lord Russell to the effect that "one
sovereign power is bound to respect the subjects and the rights of all other sovereign
powers outside its own territory." Id. at 578. The methodology was described as
follows:
Maritime law, like our municipal law, has attempted to avoid or resolve conflicts
between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between
the transaction and the states or governments whose competing laws are involved.
The criteria, in general, appear to be arrived at from weighing of the significance
of one or more connecting factors between the shipping transaction regulated and
the national interest served by the assertion of authority.
Id. at 582.
60. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1969).
61. 345 U.S. at 583.
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Place of the Wrongful Act
The traditional rule of lex loci delecti commissi was said to be of
"limited application to shipboard torts, because of the varieties of
legal authority over waters she may navigate ....
[T~he territorial standard is so unfitted to an enterprise con-
ducted under many territorial rules and under none that it usually is
modified by the more constant law of the flag .... ""
The Court recognized, however, that lex loci delecti might have
some application in certain instances in which the public policy of
the state where the injury occurred was particularly strong. 3
Recognizing that in Lauritzen a "false conflict" existed, since Cuba
had no interest whatsoever in applying its law to the transaction, no
weight was given to this factor. 4
Law of the Flag
The law of the flag was said to be of "cardinal importance.""e
Both tradition and necessity led to the conclusion that the law of the
flag "must prevail unless some heavy counterweight appears.""6
Allegiance or Domicile of the Injured
The allegiance or domicile of the injured party was stated to be
a factor that could give rise to a strong national interest. 7 Since,
however, the plaintiff was a Danish subject, this factor did not
weigh in favor of the application of United States law.
Allegiance of the Defendant Shipowner
In discussing the effect to be given the allegiance of the defen-
dant shipowner, the Court gave recognition to the practice of
registering vessels under flags of convenience, and indicated that it
might be appropriate to go "beyond the formalities of more or less
nominal foreign registration to enforce against American shipowners
the obligations which our law places upon them."" In Lauritzen,
however, the shipowner's Danish nationality pointed to the applica-
tion of Danish law.
Place of Contract
The Court also minimized the importance of the fact that the
seaman's articles had been signed in New York. Not only did the ac-
62. Id. at 583-84.
63. Id. at 584.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 586.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 587.
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tion sound in tort, but the place of contracting was generally quite
fortuitous, and would result in different members of the same crew
of the vessel having widely varied rights. 9 The Court indicated that
if the contract were to be considered at all, it would point to the ap-
pliction of Danish law."0
Inaccessibility of Foreign Forum
The fact that a foreign forum might be inaccessible was viewed
by the Court to be a factor in determining whether to retain
jurisdiction and apply foreign law, but was of almost no importance
in determining what law should be applied."
The Law of the Forum
The Court summarily rejected the argument that American law
should apply simply because the action had been brought in the
United States, indicating that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment limits the cases to which the United States can apply its
law."2 Moreover, "[tihe purpose of a conflict-of-laws doctrine is to
assure that a case will be treated in the same way under the ap-
propriate law regardless of the fortuitous circumstances which often
determine the forum. 73
After considering these factors, the Court held that Danish law
rather than American law should apply.
The Supreme Court next considered the problem in Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Company." Romero was a Spanish
crewman serving aboard the S.S. Guadalupe, a Spanish flag ship
owned by a Spanish corporation. He was injured aboard ship in the
port of Hoboken, New Jersey, and filed suit against his employer
under the Jones Act and under the general maritime law for unsea-
worthiness and maintenance and cure. He also filed suit against cer-
tain American corporations that had been engaged in stevedoring
and related operations aboard the ship for a maritime tort.
The Court first held that the same criteria used to determine
the application of American statutory law "were intended to guide
courts in the application of maritime law generally."" Thus, the ap-
plicability of American law of unseaworthiness and maintenance and
cure was to be determined in the same manner as Jones Act ap-
69. Id. at 588.
70. Id. at 589.
71. Id. at 589-90.
72. Id. at 590-91.
73. Id. at 591.
74. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
75. Id. at 382.
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plicability. The Court then rejected the argument that the fact of in-
jury in the United States was sufficient to call for the application of
American law and affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the
shipowner.
Romero thus appears to be in accord with both the letter and
the spirit of Lauritzen. Of course, Lauritzen and Romero were the
easy cases. Only the purely fortuitous fact of the signing of articles
(Lauritzen) or place of injury (Romero) gave any tie at all to this
country. To reverse the old adage, it appeared that easy cases were
making good law."6
A little more than a month before the Romero decision was
handed down, however, the second circuit had had to face a far
more difficult problem, and unfortunately, may have sown the seeds
of the disorder that is still being reaped. In Bartholomew v.
Universe Tankships, Inc.," a citizen of the British West Indies was
injured aboard a Liberian flag vessel owned and operated by a
Liberian corporation. The injury occurred in United States ter-
ritorial waters. Moreover, while the stock of the Liberian corpora-
tion was held by a Panamanian corporation, all the stock of the
Panamanian corporation was owned by citizens of the United States.
All the corporate officers of the ship-owning Liberian corporation
were American citizens, and its principal place of business was in
New York City. Finally, the plaintiff was a permanent resident of
this country, albeit an alien.
Based on these facts, the court held that the Jones Act was ap-
plicable, a result that can well be justified. The Lauritzen decision
expressly stated that a state has a considerable interest in the pro-
tection of its injured citizens and domiciliaries, as do its taxpayers,
who must support the disabled."8 The relationship of the defendant
to Liberia was purely formal. Thus, the United States' interest in
applying its law to assure the protection of one of its residents
would appear to be far greater than any Liberian interest in assert-
ing its authority over a ship owned and operated by Americans.
This was precisely the case that Justice Jackson had envisioned in
Lauritzen in which a flag of convenience should be ignored so that
an essentially American relationship can be governed by American
law.
While the result in Bartholomew is certainly justifiable, the
modus operandi was questionable. Lauritzen had fairly clearly re-
76. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 39, at §§ 6-63.
77. 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959).
78. See text at note 67, supra.
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quired a traditional conflicts approach. 9 Nevertheless, the court
viewed its role as simply one of statutory construction and stated
that "traditional choice of law techniques may be more misleading
than helpful";0 and, it rejected a "center of gravity" or "place of
most vital connection"81 approach:
Hence it must be said that in a particular case something be-
tween minimal and preponderant contacts is necessary if the
Jones Act is to be applied. Thus we conclude that the test is
that "substantial" contacts are necessary. And while ... one con-
tact such as the fact that the vessel flies the American flag may
alone be sufficient, this is no more than to say that in such a
case the contact is so obviously substantial as to render unneces-
sary a further probing into the facts.82
The court felt it was inappropriate "to consider and 'weigh' the con-
tacts that do not exist . . . ."" The court then went on to state that
American ownership alone was sufficient to warrant application of
the Jones Act.8'
The court's holding that it is unnecessary to attempt to deter-
mine whether some other jurisdiction might have a more compelling
interest in the transaction than the United States and that our law
applied if "substantial" contacts existed, without regard to whether
other contacts were more "substantial," was clearly contrary to the
spirit if not the letter of Lauritzen. Moreover, the statement that
American beneficial ownership was in and of itself sufficient was
pure dictum. Nonetheless, the court's opinion has in large part
shaped the development of the law in this field.
The Bartholomew approach received a stamp of approval from
the Supreme Court in Hellenic Lines Limited v. Rhoditis." Rhoditis
was a Greek seaman injured aboard a Greek flag ship in the port of
New Orleans. The ship was owned and managed by a Greek corpora-
tion that had its largest office in New York. Almost all of the stock
of the Greek Corporation was owned by a Greek subject who had
lived in the United States for almost 25 years. The vessel and its
sister ship were frequent visitors to United States ports. On these
facts, the Court held that the Jones Act was applicable.
79. See text at notes 44-45, supra.
80. 263 F.2d at 439.
81. Id. at 440.
82. Id. at 440-41.
83. Id. at 441.
84. Id. at 443 n.4.
85. 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
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The Court first stated that the Lauritzen test was not a
mechanical one8" and that the seven factors were not exhaustive.
The shipowner's "base of operations" was another factor which,
among possibly others, could call for the application of American
law.8 Using an approach very similar to that adopted by the second
circuit in Bartholomew and expressly relying on language in that
decision, the Court stated the objective as being to effectuate "the
liberal purposes of the Jones Act."'" Then, relying on the assumption
that had the defendant been an American citizen the Jones Act
would have applied without ftrther question, the Court reasoned
that a resident alien should not be given a competitive advantage
over American citizens through avoidance of Jones Act responsibil-
ity.90
Justice Harlan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stewart, entered a well-reasoned dissent that hearkened back to the
spirit of Lauritzen: "[T]he primary purpose of Lauritzen . . . was to
reconcile the all-embracing language of the Jones Act with those
principles of comity embodied in international and maritime law that
are designed to foster amicable and workable commercial relations
... ,91 Justice Harlan questioned what interest the United States
had in recompensing foreign seamen employed on foreign flag ves-
sels and attacked on both economic and philosophical grounds the
majority's professed desire to enhance the competitiveness of the
American merchant marine.
Justice Douglas' Rhoditis opinion contains a serious internal con-
tradiction. While decrying a "mechanical" test, the simple weighing
of contacts with the United States to determine whether those con-
tacts are in sum "substantial" without placing in the balance the in-
terests other nations may have in the transaction is nothing if not
"mechanical." Similarly, the assumption that any one factor, such as
beneficial ownership, is alone sufficient to tip the scales, with no
regard for countervailing interests, is somewhat simplistic.
Needless to say, the Court's adoption of the methodology of Bar-
tholomew significantly devalued the law of the flag. Lauritzen, in at-
tempting to balance competing national interests, had relied on the
traditional interest of the state of documentation in governing af-
fairs connected with vessels flying its colors and had held that the
86. Id. at 308.
87. Id. at 309.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 310.
90. Id.
91. 398 U.S. at 318 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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law of the flag was presumptively applicable. In the wake of
Rhoditis, which apparently approved an approach that looked only
to the United States' interest in a transaction, the law of the flag
became a relatively insignificant basis for decision. If some "substan-
tial contact" was found, such as beneficial ownership or operation by
American interests, the flag was simply disregarded. In most cases
in which no substantial contact was found, and American law was
hence inapplicable, the court usually declined jurisdiction under the
theory of forum non conveniens and thus never reached the question
of whether the law of the flag or the law of the "base of operations"
or yet some other law applied. Accordingly, the principle of "car-
dinal importance" was at times not even mentioned in the
decisions.2
The principal questions to be resolved after Rhoditis were what
factors were to be used to determine whether a "base of operations"
had been shown, and the validity of the dictum in Bartholomew (and
assumption in Rhoditis) that American beneficial interest was in and
of itself sufficient. The answers given to these questions by the
courts have been utterly irreconcilable. 3
92. See, e.g., Moncada v. Lemuria Shipping Corp., 491 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1974).
93. None of the other factors enumerated in Lauritzen has ever been given great
consideration. Lauritzen and even Rhoditis placed little value on the fact that the in-
jury may have occurred in the United States. Until the recent cases involving offshore
operations, the place of injury has been viewed as fortuitous and has been relatively
unimportant in deciding choice-of-law cases. But see Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V., 628
F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980).
The place where the contract of employment was made and stipulations for applica-
tion of foreign law have been accorded almost no value. Lauritzen itself had suggested
that stipulations for application of the law of a foreign country might be honored
where there are no substantial contacts with the United States so as to call for the ap-
plication of the United States law, but that the parties may not oust the application of
the Jones Act and the general maritime law of the United States by a stipulation in
the contract of employment. The lower courts have followed this approach. Pan-
dazopoulos v. Universal Cruise Line, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In Voyiat-
zis v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), the court
expressly referred to the reluctance to enforce such provisions between parties of un-
equal bargaining power and the express prohibition against such agreements in the
Federal Employers Liability Act. 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1976).
Justice Jackson in Lauritzen specifically stated that the availability of an alter-
native forum should be afforded slight weight in determining choice of law, although it
could be a pertinent factor in determining whether to dismiss on the basis of forum
non conveniens. The lower courts have been generally faithful to this approach. And
while the argument has been put forward on occasion that the listing of the "law of the
forum" in Lauritzen indicates that if recovery under foreign law would be so low as to
be unjust, American law should be applied, the courts have fairly uniformly rejected
this argument. See, e.g., de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 613 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1980).
The fact that an injured seaman was a citizen or domiciliary of the United StatesI
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The second circuit has taken an expansive view of the notion of
a "base of operations" and has indicated that almost any beneficial
ownership is sufficient. In Moncada v. Lemuria Shipping Corp.," the
plaintiff filed suit for the wrongful death of her decedent, a Hon-
duran seaman whQ had died aboard a vessel owned and operated by
the defendant. The court's opinion is indicative of the low esteem
now given the law of the flag; the court does not even mention what
standard the vessel flew. Rather, the court looked principally to the
beneficial ownership of the vessel (which was American) and cited
its Bartholomew opinion for the proposition that this alone was suf-
ficient."' The court then went on to list other factors it deemed
significant in terms of a "base of operations": the location of manag-
ing and chartering agents in the United States, the American citi-
zenship of the officers of the defendant, and the fact that 40% of the
vessel's voyages began or ended in American ports. These factors,
together with beneficial ownership, established an American "base
of operations" and American law applied.
Moncada was followed by Antypas v. Compania Maritima San
Basilio, S.A.," in which the second circuit further expanded the no-
tion of "base of operations." The court found that "at least some of
the stockholders of the shipowner . . . are American citizens,"" and
stated that now any beneficial ownership was enough "to support
jurisdiction under the Jones Act [sic]." 9 The court also placed
reliance on the fact that the defendant was but part of a single ship-
ping empire, and the empire itself was run from New York. Since
the shipowner was thus under the "direct control" of the New York
operation,' and earnings "appear to be collected in New York and
had been given conclusive weight before and after the Supreme Court's decision in
Lauritzen. Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., Inc., 282 U.S. 234 (1931); Symonette Shipyards, Ltd.
v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1966). The courts, however, have tended to scrutinize
fairly carefully claims that American law should apply because of American residence.
For the obvious reason that a party should not be able to obtain the benefits of our
law simply by moving here, the establishment of residence in the United States after
the fact of injury has been accorded little weight. Frangiskatos v. Konkar Maritime
Enterprises, S.A., 1973 A.M.C. 333 (2d Cir. 1972); Helu v. Nauru Pacific Line, 1978
A.M.C. 1996 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Rivadeneira v. Skibs A/S Snefonn, 1973 A.M.C. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). Nor has the fact of a personal injury plaintiffs marriage to an
American been afforded much weight. Camarias v. MW Lady Era, 1970 A.M.C. 74
(E.D. Va. 1969).
94. 491 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1974).
95. Id. at 473.
96. Id.
97. 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976).





the expenses of the vessel paid from New York,""1 1 the Jones Act
was held to be applicable.
The Antypas opinion must have left counsel for the defendant in
a state of shock. Apparently, the only evidence to support any
beneficial ownership by American citizens or domiciliaries was a
deposition taken in another action some fifteen years before, and
there were substantial indications that the facts had changed in the
interim."2 Moreover, while the shipowner may have been part of a
larger shipping consortium based in New York, the opinion does not
indicate the extent of operational decisions made in New York. In
Rhoditis, the opinions of the various courts indicated that the de-
fendant had offices only in the United States, and all landbased
operational decisions were made here. Thus, that opinion merely had
indicated that where virtually complete beneficial ownership and
operational control of a vessel lay in the United States, the opera-
tion would be viewed as American and the obligations imposed on
Americans could not be avoided. This is a far cry from the implica-
tion in Antypas that any beneficial ownership or right of control in
this country is a sufficient "substantial contact" for our law to be ap-
plied.
The implications of the Antypas decision bore fruit in Mattes v.
National Hellenic American Line, S.A.' In Mattes, the vessel was
apparently beneficially owned in toto by foreign nationals and
domiciliaries. The vessel did make voyages to the United States and
received substantial revenue from this country, and the "manage-
ment and operation" of the vessel was "centered in part in New
York."1 ' On these facts, the court found the Jones Act applicable.'00
The second circuit has not been alone in carrying the reasoning
of Bartholomew to the extreme. In Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V' 6 the
fifth circuit has given American law an incredibly expansive pur-
view.107
101. Id.
102. See 541 F.2d at 310 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
103. 427 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. igi 0.
104. Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
105. While the Second Circuit has indicated that mere United States financing of a
vessel is not enough to require the application of American law, Sanchez v. Caribbean
Carriers, Ltd, 1977 A.M.C. 1584 (2d.Cir. 1977), in Pandazopoulos v. Universal Cruise
Line, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), it appears that actual ownership was placed
in an American corporation as a financing device, and the American financiers held
positions on the board of the owning and operating corporations. American law was
held applicable.
106. 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980).
107. The Fifth Circuit has not always been so liberal in the application of American
law. In Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 1965 A.M.C. 1405 (5th Cir. 1965), the court
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The M/V Agios Nicolaos V was a Greek flag vessel owned by a
Liberian corporation and operated by a Panamanian corporation.
Both the owner and operator were wholly owned and operated by
Greek nationals and domicilaries. It was the only ship owned by the
Liberian corporation and had only recently been purchased. Im-
mediately after purchasing the vessel, it had been sent to Beaumont,
Texas, for refitting to carry its first cargo, a shipment of grain con-
signed to the Soviet Union. The Plaintiff's decedent, a Greek na-
tional and domiciliary, had been flown to Beaumont to meet the ship;
he met his death as a result of an engine room fire. The district
court held that American law was applicable, and the fifth circuit af-
firmed.
While the fifth circuit did make a pretense of weighing whether
the application of American or Greek law was more appropriate,10 '
the analysis really used was fairly clearly a search for any contact
whatsoever to justify the application of American law. In holding
that the district court had not erred in finding a "base of
operations" in the United States, the fifth circuit reasoned that since
the vessel had been on her maiden voyage under the defendant's
ownership and management, her "entire business activity prior
to the accident had been in the United States."'1 9 Relying on An-
typas and Moncada for the proposition that a "base of operations"
can be shown simply on the basis of substantial revenue deriving
from American sources or a substantial number of voyages
originating or terminating here, the court held American law ap-
plicable.
The opinion of the fifth circuit is irreconcilable with even the
requirement of "substantial contacts"'1 0 and is a mockery of
Lauritzen. To rely on the mere fact of a percentage of revenue or
number of voyages originating from this country is to adopt a sim-
ple "minimum contacts" test for the application of American law and
to extend the reach of our substantive law to the reach of due pro-
cess. In view of this country's volume of trade, and the fact that
many shipowning nations such as Greece operate many ships that
held that United States law was inapplicable, even though the vessel was beneficially
owned by Americans.
108. 628 F.2d at 308.
109. Id. at 318.
110. Even the Second Circuit has rejected the idea that merely having a subsidiary
corporation in the United States that acted as agent for the ship's operations here was
"substantial contact." Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 535 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir.
1976); Manlugon v. A/S Facto, 1976 A.M.C. 2471 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The courts in the Sec-
ond Circuit have also rejected the idea that mere volume of voyages to United States
ports is sufficient. Hazell v. Boothe S.S. Co., Ltd., 436 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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undoubtedly spend much of their careers carrying cargoes to or
from our ports, adoption of the Fisher standard could well impose
lex Americana on much of the seafaring world. This is what
Lauritzen very explicitly set out to avoid.
While the Court of Appeals for the second and fifth circuits
were limiting Lauritzen to nothing more than an obligatory preface
to an opinion on choice of law, the third circuit in DeMateos v. Tex-
aco, Inc."' was treating Rhoditis as an unfortunate aberration.
Theodore Reyes was a Panamanian seaman aboard the S.S. Tex-
aco Kenya. Reyes became ill on a voyage between Honduras and
Costa Rica and died shortly after being hospitalized in Costa Rica.
His mother, Ms. DeMateos, filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the Jones Act,
the Death on High Seas Act, and the general maritime law, claiming
that her son's death was the result of negligence and unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel.
The Texaco Kenya was owned by Texaco Panama, Inc. [Texpan],
a Panamanian corporation, and was registered in Liberia. The vessel
was managed by Texaco Overseas Tankship United [TOT], a British
corporation with its principal place of business in London. TOT was
a wholly owned subsidiary of Texaco Operations (Europe) Ltd.
[TOEL], a Delaware corporation. Texaco, Inc. owned all of Texpan
and TOEL.
On these facts, the third circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that United States law was inapplicable. First, the court re-
jected the idea set forth in Rhoditis that the purpose of the analysis
is to effectuate "the liberal purposes of the Jones Act" ' as "social
jingoism.""' Rather, the purpose of the analysis was whether the
American law should be applied, considering "conventions of inter-
national law.""' The second circuit's position that beneficial owner-
ship alone was sufficient was expressly rejected,"5 with the court
even questioning the constitutionality of this doctrine.' The distinct
corporate existence of Texpan and TOT was respected, with the
court stating that Texpan and TOEL had separate boards of direc-
tors and maintained separate books of account."7
It is extraordinarily difficult to reconcile DeMateos with the
111. 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977).
112. 398 U.S. at 310.
113. 562 F.2d at 902.
114. Id. at 901.





cases emanating from the second and fifth circuits in view of the
third circuit's express rejection of the notion that beneficial owner-
ship is alone a "substantial contact." The reason for the conflict is
fairly obvious; these courts are not even asking the same questions.
The second circuit's analysis, like that of the majority in Rhoditis,
aims at determining whether the contacts with the United States
are "substantial" enough to allow the court to "effectuate the liberal
purposes" of American law. The third circuit, like the Lauritzen
majority, seeks to determine which forum has the most significant
contact with the transaction, so as to determine whether American
law or the law of some other forum would be more appropriate.
With such different questions being asked, it is little wonder that
the answers have been so widely divergent.
THE OFFSHORE SETTING
With the history of the choice-of-law question in bluewater sea-
man's personal injury actions in mind, we can now turn to the devel-
opment of the law in the offshore setting. At the outset, it should be
noted that inherent differences exist in the two types of operations.
Traditional shipping is a truly transnational enterprise. The tramp
freighter or liner that is in a United States port this week may be in
South America or Europe or Africa next week and in the interim
will be beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any sovereign.
Moreover, while many nations require vessels flying their own flag
to have a crew composed of a certain percentage of their own na-
tionals, many other vessels, particularly those flying flags of conve-
nience, set sail with polyglot crews made up of citizens of various
nations who may have joined the vessel at any one of a number of
ports.
Conversely, offshore operations are by their very nature
centered in one spot for a relatively long period of time. A drilling
rig may be immobile at one drilling site for months or even years.
Moreover, these locations are always within an area claimed by
some sovereign, since the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958 has
internationalized the position taken earlier by the United States and
other countries in asserting jurisdiction over the Outer Continental
Shelf."8 Also, many nations require that some component of the off-
shore work force be drawn from the local populace. These distinc-
tions have at times weighed heavily on the minds of the courts
deciding cases in this area.




The first case to consider the applicability of the Jones Act in a
typical offshore setting was Farmer v. Standard Dredging Corp. "9
In Farmer, the plaintiff, a United States citizen, was employed
aboard a United States flag dredge; he was injured while the dredge
was operating in the territorial waters of Venezuela. He filed suit
under the Jones Act, and the defendant claimed that the claim was
barred by certain provisions of Venezuelan law which had been in-
corporated in the employment contract. In view of the fact that the
plaintiff was an American citizen, and the vessel was a United
States flag vessel, it should not be surprising that the court held
that United States law was applicable. The case is important, how-
ever, in that the court was troubled by the distinction between off-
shore operations and traditional bluewater activities. The court
stated that there would be little doubt that the Jones Act would ap-
ply regardless of any provisions of Venezuelan law "if the vessel
traversed the seas and called at ports of different nations during the
plaintiffs employment";12 but, the court was concerned with the fact
that the plaintiff's employment on the dredge was "localized in the
territorial waters of Venezuela."'1
21
The distinction that troubled the court in Farmer has not always
been given much weight. In Rode v. Sedco, Inc.,12 a German citizen
who had established permanent residence in the United States was
held to be entitled to invoke the protection of the Jones Act in a
suit against a Canadian subsidiary of a Texas corporation. Not only
would a plaintiff's permanent residence in the United States prob-
ably have been sufficient to establish the applicability of American
law, but a strong showing was made that the Canadian operation
was actually run from the United States and was Canadian in name
only. The Canadian subsidiary's employment contract with the plain-
tiff was in fact signed by one of the American parent's corporate of-
ficers, who also authorized expenditures for the vessel. Other of-
ficials considered themselves "joint employees" of the parent and
subsidiary."'
Based on these facts, the court's analysis of the Lauritzen
criteria would appear to be fairly routine. The case is notable,
however, because of the relative insignificance given the fact that
the vessel was a semi-submersible rig drilling off tne coast of Scot-
land in an area over which Great Britain asserted jurisdiction.
Perhaps because defense counsel apparently argued solely for the
119. 167 F. Supp. 381 (D. Del 1958).
120. Id. at 383.
121. Id.
122. 394 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Tex. 1975).
123. Id. at 209.
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application of Canadian, rather than British, law, the court simply
cited the language in Lauritzen to the effect that the mobility of
vessels makes lex loci delicti an inappropriate standard.
Similarly, in Castanho v. Jackson Marine, Inc.,12 the court held
that there was "jurisdiction" to entertain a Jones Act claim by a
Portuguese seaman injured in Great Britain aboard a Panamanian
flag vessel beneficially owned by American interests. Again, there
was no consideration of the distinct nature of offshore operations.
The first decision actually to turn in part on the unique nature
of offshore operations was House v. Santa Fe International Corp."2 5
In House, the plaintiffs decedent, a British subject and Italian
domiciliary, met his death while employed by a British company as a
diver on a semi-submersible drilling rig operating off the coast of
England. The rig was owned and operated by American corpora-
tions, flew the United States flag, and was operating under contract
to another American company.
In considering the applicability of American law, the court paid
attention to the fact that the casualty had occurred "in an area sub-
ject to British jurisdiction."""8 Then, noting that the "day-to-day
operation of the . . . [vessel] was out of the Aberdeen [Scotland] of-
fice,"" the court held that American law was inapplicable and
dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens.
Even more explicit recognition to the unique nature of offshore
activity was given by the third circuit in de Alvarez v. Creole
Petroleum Corp.28 In that case, wrongful death suits were filed as a
result of an explosion aboard a vessel owned by Creole Petroleum
Corp. [Creole]; the accident occurred while the vessel was located in
Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela. The decedents were all Venezuelan
citizens, and Creole was found to have its corporate headquarters in
Caracas, although it was Delaware corporation. Creole was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Exxon. The vessel was documented in Vene-
zuela and had never left the internal waters of Venezuela.
On these facts, the court held that American law was inap-
plicable. Weighing the interests of Venezuela against those of the
United States, and emphasizing that Creole's contacts with its
parent corportion did not involve the operations which had led to
124. 484 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
125. 1978 A.M.C. 1899 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
126. Id. at 1904.
127. Id. at 1900.
128. 613 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1980).
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this lawsuit," the court held that the Venezuelan interest was
superior to that of the United States.
Perhaps the most dramatic decision was recently handed down
by the ninth circuit in Phillips v. Amoco Trinidad Oil Company."'
In Phillips, a number of Trinidadian employees were injured or killed
as the result of a blowout and fire aboard the drilling rig Mariner I,
a United States flag vessel. The rig was owned by Santa Fe Drilling
Co., a United States corporation, and was operating under contract
to Amoco Trinidad, a Delaware corporation with its principal offices
in Trinidad. The Mariner I had been operating in Trinidadian waters
for almost four years, and the government of Trinidad and Tobago
controlled the makeup of the crew by limiting the number of work
permits for non-Trinidadian nationals.
In analyzing the question of applicable law, the court spent con-
siderable effort in analyzing the nature of the test. The court ex-
pressly rejected as an "unrealistic interpretation"'31 the second cir-
cuit test of merely finding a substantial connection with the United
States. Rather, the court returned to the language of Lauritzen,
which required a valuing of "points of contact between the transac-
tion and the states or governments whose competing laws are in-
volved.""' Thus, the court held that the analysis was a "com-
parative, and not an absolute, evaluation.""'
Applying this approach, the court found that the interests of
Trinidad predominated. Lex loci delicti, while inapplicable in the set-
ting of bluewater shipping, had more force: "Here the locus is un-
changing and the logic of local experience can profitably be applied
to the claims of these Trinidad nationals. That these workers were
injured immediately offshore of Trinidad is no fortuity . "... "'
Moreover, greater weight was placed on the allegiance and
domicile of the workers, since the employment of these workers had
never taken them beyond the territorial boundaries of Trinidad.
This also gave additional weight to the place of contracting."'
The court's discussion of the base of operation criterion was
directly in line with the approach taken in de Alvarez. Admitting
that Santa Fe's corporate headquarters was in California and that
129. Id. at 1247.
130. 632 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1980).
131. Id. at 86.
132. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 86.
134. Id. at 87.
135. Id. at 87.
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this office kept in contact with the operations of the Mariner I, the
court thought that it was the "base of operations of the relevant
business venture rather than of the corporate owner of the vessel" '138
that was important. The place of day-to-day operations, rather than
corporate headquarters, was determinative.
The implication of Phillips, de Alvarez, House, and numerous
other lower court cases is patent. At least in the field of offshore
operations, there appears to be developing a strong return to the
choice-of-law analysis of Lauritzen that allows consideration of the
interests of other countries which can be so predominant in offshore
operations and advocates rejection of the statutory construction ap-
proach of Rhoditis and of the simple mechanistic search for some
United States involvement upon which to base applicability of the
Jones Act. Moreover, these courts have defined the "base of opera-
tions" criterion in terms of operational control of day-to-day activity,
rather than a simple link of ownership or right to control by United
States nationals.
While there are no decisions from the second and fifth circuits
dealing with choice of law in the area of offshore operations, the
methodology used in Moncada, Antypas, and Fisher would indicate
that these courts are on a direct collision course with the third and
ninth circuits. The conflict might be partially resolved by the fifth
or ninth circuits on rehearing in Fisher or Phillips, but it appears
that ultimately review by the Supreme Court or a legislative solu-
tion will be needed to resolve the conflict.
THE PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
A possible alternative to resolution by the Supreme Court would
be a legislative solution, and a bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives last year that would amend the Jones Act by ad-
ding the following subsection:
(b)(1) Except as provided under paragraph (2), no action may be
maintained under subsection (a) of this section or under any
other maritime law of the United States for damages for the in-
jury of death of any person who was not a citizen or permanent
resident alien of the United States at the time of the incident
giving rise to the action, if the incident occurred-
(A) in connection -with the operation of any special purpose
vessel designed for utilization in connection with activities
relating to the offshore exploration for, or production of, oil,
136. Id. at 88.
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gas, or other minerals, including drilling, provision of sup-
plies, surveying, diving, pipelaying, or other construction ac-
tivities; and
(B) in any area other than an area within (i) the United
States, (ii) the territorial waters of the United States, or (iii)
the Outer Continental Shelf of the United States as defined
under section 2(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
As used in subparagraph (B)(i) of this paragraph, the term
"United States" means any State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, the Mariana Islands, American Samoa, the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any other territory or
possession of the United States.
(2) Any action for damages to which paragraph (1) applies may
be maintained only if the person bringing such action establishes
that no remedy is available for such damages (or was available
at any time after the incident giving rise to the action) under
the laws of any country-
(A) asserting jurisdiction over the area in which the incident
occurred; or
(B) in which, at the time of the incident, the person for
whose injury or death damages are sought maintained citi-
zenship or residency."7
This proposed legislation would closely approximate the result
of the Phillips decision. The applicability of American law would
turn on the citizenship or residence of the plaintiff within the
United States and the situs of the accident. The flag of the vessel
would not be a pertinent factor.
As with any legislation, the bill poses certain problems of con-
struction. The bill refers only to incidents occurring "in connection
with the operation of any special purpose vessel." This would cer-
tainly include drilling vessels such as semi-submersible rigs and
other vessels such as pipelay barges. Beyond that, all is conjecture.
Would a deck barge used in pipelaying activities be a "special pur-
pose vessel"? Certainly an argument could be made that such tradi-
tional craft as service vessels and supply vessels were not included
within the purview of the bill, although the foreign workers aboard
these vessels are more akin to workers on drilling vessels than to
seamen on traditional oceangoing cargo ships with regard to the
137. H.R. 6705 96th Cong., 20 Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 35 (1980).
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localization of their work and their constant contact with one juris-
diction..
Moreover, there have been some constitutional objections raised
to the proposed legislation. The argument has been advanced that
the singling out of one class of seaman constitutes invidious dis-
crimination prohibited by the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. 8 In view of the broad discretion given to Congress to
legislate in economic matters and the traditional delineation of
categories or workers in the maritime field with different remedies
(e.g., longshoremen, seamen, etc.), the constitutional objections
would seem to be tenuous at best.
Far more serious questions can be raised as to the political
viability of the legislation. After one day of hearings, opponents to
the bill, principally the plaintiff's personal injury bar and certain
unions, stated that they had objections to the proposed legislation
and asked for more time to prepare their opposition. The Merchant
Marine Subcommittee of the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries yielded to this request, and no further hearings have
been scheduled to date. Accordingly, the bill is certainly dead for
the 96th Congress. Whether or not it will be reintroduced in the
97th Congress may in part depend on whether some judicial resolu-
tion of the problem is forthcoming.
NON-SEAMEN AND NON-MARITIME INJURIES
In view of the great bulk of litigation in the area of foreign sea-
man claims, it is somewhat anomalous that there has been so little
litigation in this country regarding the rights of non-seamen arising
out of injuries on fixed platforms in foreign waters."' There are
clearly certain practical reasons for the lack of litigation insofar as
foreign nationals are concerned. With regard to claims against an
employer, the LHWCA is by its own terms inapplicable, since such
injuries do not occur on navigable waters of the United States or on
the Outer Continental Shelf. " ' State compensation remedies are thus
the only conceivable American remedies available against an em-
ployer, and the difference between domestic law of the place of in-
jury and state systems is probably not so great as to justify suit in
the United States. Moreover, there are significant jurisdictional
138. The statements of Robert A. Jenkins in respect of H.R. 6705 to the Merchant
Marine Subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, United States
House of Representatives treat this question.
139. This writer was unable to find any decided cases involving platform injuries.
140. See notes 38-39, supra, and accompanying text.
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hurdles to claims against third parties. Since such claims are not
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court,"' do not in-
volve a federal statute and often involve only foreign entities, thus
depriving the court of diversity of alienage jurisdiction, "' litigation
in federal court is not available. Moreover, the conflict of laws doc-
trines of most states would apply to foreign law anyway." '
American workers employed abroad often have choice-of-law
clauses in their employment contracts calling for the application of
the workers' compensation law of a particular state, or provisions
calling for the employer to pay the employee in the event of injury a
scale of benefits incorporated into the contract by reference to the
compensation act of some states. While the former provisions are of
questionable value, the latter type of provision has been judicially
enforced." 5
CONCLUSION
The law governing the rights of foreign seamen and other off-
shore workers is obviously at a critical juncture in its development.
The divergent trend of the circuits leads not only to general confu-
sion as to the state of the law, but adds the problem of intranational
as well as international forum shopping. Hopefully, a reasoned
resolution will be forthcoming from the courts or Congress.
141. See note 48, supra, and accompanying text.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
143. Under either the traditional lex loci delecti or the modern approach of the
Restatement, such injuries would probably be governed by foreign law.
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